631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

●432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
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payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

●[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past.[1] Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

[1] [after 1933 famine + Russification -- analyst]